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FORFEITURE OF MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7): IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
I. INTRODUCTION
To wage the war on drugs more effectively, Congress has amended
the drug enforcement laws to provide for the forfeiture of real and per-
sonal property.' Forfeitures under these laws may be either civil or
criminal in nature.2 Civil forfeitures, known as in rem 3 proceedings, are
conducted against property involved in the statutorily defined illegal ac-
tivity, not against the property owner.4 By contrast, criminal forfeitures,
known as in personam5 proceedings, are conducted against the owner of
1. See Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third
Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254, 1255-56 (for-
feiture laws enacted as means to fight crimes such as narcotics trafficking and
racketeering); see also Edith A. Landman & John Hieronymus, Civil Forfeiture of
Real Property Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 1991 MICH. BARJ. 174.
Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 (Drug Control Act), in 1978 by adding § 881(a)(6). Psycho-
tropics Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(1), 92 Stat. 3768,
3777 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)). The amendment of
§ 881 of the Drug Control Act provided for the seizure of "property furnished in
exchange for illegal drugs or proceeds traceable to such an exchange." 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). Then in 1984, Congress amended the Drug Control
Act by passing comprehensive forfeiture provisions. Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 2040-57 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.). The amend-
ment of § 881 reflected the mandate of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984, and "provide[d] for the forfeiture of real property ... used to facilitate
any felony drug violation of the Control Substances Act." Id. at § 306(a), 98
Stat. at 2050 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). Thus, the
amendments of the civil forfeiture provisions of the Drug Control Act arm the
government with the tools needed to wage the drug war and to eliminate any
profits gained through the sale of illegal drugs. Id.
2. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174.
3. An in rem proceeding is "[a] technical term used to designate proceed-
ings or actions against the thing." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th Ed. 1990).
4. See Dennis R. Hewitt, Comment, Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties,
1983 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323, 325. Civil in rem forfeiture proceedings provide for
the forfeiture of property used in an illegal act. Id. Such forfeiture is conducted
solely against the property used in connection with the illegal act, regardless of
the property owner's guilt or innocence. Id. Thus, an innocent property owner
may be deprived of property that is used for illegal purposes despite the fact that
he or she neither knew of nor consented to the illegal use. Id.; see also James R.
Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law--Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
768, 784 (1977).
5. An in personam proceeding is an "action seeking judgment against a
person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 791; see also Hewitt, Comment, supra
note 4, at 325. In personam forfeiture proceedings operate "directly against the
defendant in a criminal prosecution, rather than his property, and any property
(1487)
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property as punishment for involvement in criminal activity. 6 Thus, re-
gardless of a property owner's guilt or innocence, the property is subject
to in rem forfeiture. 7
Courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of a wide
range of civil in rem forfeiture statutes on the grounds that the govern-
ment effects the forfeiture on the property and not on its owner.8 As a
result, an innocent party may forfeit property under a civil forfeiture
statute if the innocent owner's property is used by another in a manner
prohibited by statute.9 Some statutes provide the innocent owner with a
defense against forfeiture once the government establishes that prob-
able cause exists to seize the property; however, the innocent owner has
the burden of proving any statutory defenses.' 0
he has illegally acquired or maintained is subject to forfeiture." Goldsmith &
Linderman, supra note 1, at 1260. Thus, in personam proceedings are only con-
ducted against property owners convicted of the illegal activity and operate to
punish the wrongdoer. Id.
6. See Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 325. In order to conduct an in
personam forfeiture of property, "the government must first obtain a conviction
against the property owner." Id. at 325 n. 11; see also Maxeiner, supra note 4, at
784-85 (indicating that in personam forfeiture requires the government to estab-
lish personal guilt of property owner in accordance with the form proscribed by
the Constitution).
7. See Maxeiner, supra note 4, at 768. The theory underlying civil in rem
forfeiture is that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing. Id. Thus, the pro-
ceeding is conducted against the "guilty" property and not its owner. Id. In
fact, "no suit need ever be brought against the owner, who may, in fact, be inno-
cent of any wrongdoing." Id.
8. Id. The Supreme Court has endorsed the imposition of vicarious liability
under statutes similar to the civil forfeiture statutes in the Drug Control Act:
[C]enturies of history support the Government's claim that forfeiture
statutes similar to this one have extraordinarily broad scope .... Sim-
ply put, the theory has been that if the object is "guilty," it should be
held forfeit. In the words of a medieval English writer, "Where a man
killeth another with the sword ofJohn at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit
as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner."
Id. (quoting United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-
20 (1971)); see also Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
In Goldsmith, the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of an automobile that was
used to transport untaxed liquor in violation of a federal statute despite the au-
tomobile owner's innocence. Id. at 513. In reaching this conclusion, the Gold-
smith Court reasoned that the property itself was guilty of wrongdoing, and thus
was subject to forfeiture. Id.
9. See Susan J. Parcels, Comment, An Analysis of Federal Drug-Related Civil For-
feiture, 34 ME. L. REV. 435, 436 (1982). In order to justify civil in rem forfeiture
today, the government relies upon the "personification theory." Id. The per-
sonification theory provides that the property itself is guilty of the wrongdoing.
Id.; see also Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 332 (noting that "an innocent
person whose property is used by another in the commission of an offense may
find that his property is subject to civil forfeiture").
10. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 1, at 1261-62. The government
must establish probable cause by linking the property to illegal drug activity. Id.
at 1261; see also Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 177. In order to meet
the burden of proof in a civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
2
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The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970"1 (Drug Control Act) provides for the civil forfeiture of real and
personal property used to facilitate illegal drug trade. 12 Congress en-
acted the Drug Control Act to enable law enforcement officials to stem
the rising tide of narcotics trafficking and to deter drug abuse in the
United States.' 3 As originally enacted, the Drug Control Act included a
civil forfeiture mechanism in § 881 which mandated the forfeiture of ve-
hicles, drug paraphernalia and raw materials used to facilitate illegal
drug activity. 14 Because the proceedings under § 881 are in rem, the
property owner's criminal conviction is not required before commenc-
(1988), "the government must have probable cause to connect the real estate
with the illegal drug activity, but is not required to link the property to a particu-
lar transaction." Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 177. The govern-
ment may rely on both circumstantial evidence and hearsay evidence to establish
probable cause. Id. at 177-78.
Once the government establishes probable cause, the "burden shifts to the
claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the forfeiture is inap-
propriate because: 1) the real property was not used to facilitate the commission
of a drug offense; or 2) any such use was without the claimant's 'knowledge or
consent.'" Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 1, at 1262. If the claimant fails
to meet the burden, a mere showing of probable cause will sustain ajudgment of
forfeiture. Id.
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). In pertinent part, § 881(a)(7) provides:
(a) Subject Property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (in-
cluding any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of
land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facili-
tate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or con-
sent of that owner.
Id.
13. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174. Congress enacted the
Drug Control Act as part of its effort to fight the proliferation of the illegal drug
trade in the United States. Id. The civil forfeiture provisions in § 881 of the
Drug Control Act were designed to take "the profit out of the business of illicit
drug sales." Id.; see also Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doc-
trine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture. in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV.
165, 167 (1990) (indicating that by enacting the Drug Control Act, Congress
intended "to use forfeiture to deter and punish drug traffickers .. . 'by removing
its leaders from positions of ownership, . . . and by visiting heavy economic sanctions
on their predatory business practices' " (quoting Senator Robert Byrd, 116 Cong. Rev.
1970)).
14. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174 (noting that
"[§] 881(a)(7) is specifically directed at the real property that is used as a
'container' for illegal drugs").
1992] COMMENT 1489
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ing a proceeding against the property involved.15
Soon after the enactment of the Drug Control Act, however, it be-
came apparent that the forfeiture provisions in § 881 needed strength-
ening. 16 In 1978, Congress amended § 88117 to include the forfeiture
of real property received in exchange for illegal drugs or any proceeds
traceable to such transactions.1 8
Despite the 1978 amendment, drug trafficking and abuse prolifer-
ated. 19 In response, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984 (Comprehensive Forfeiture Act).20 The Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act demonstrates Congress' attempt to enhance and to
strengthen the scope of the forfeiture provisions in the Drug Control
Act. 2 1 The 1984 amendment of § 881 provides for the forfeiture of all
real property used "to facilitate any felony drug violations of the Con-
trolled Substances Act."' 22 Prior to the amendment, real property could
not be forfeited under § 881 unless the government demonstrated that
profits from illegal drug transactions were used to purchase the real
property. 23 With the enactment of the 1984 amendment, Congress
15. Id. at 174-76.
16. Id. at 174.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). Section 881(a)(6) provides:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds trace-
able to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this para-
graph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174 (Forfeiture laws had failed
to be "a powerful weapon to federal law enforcement agencies.").
20. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301-323, 98 Stat. 2040-57 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.); see also
Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174.
21. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374-3404. Congress recognized that traditional criminal sanc-
tions were not sufficient to deter the rapid growth of the illegal drug trade in the
United States. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374. Thus the bill was
designed to extend the scope of the forfeiture provisions to real property used
to facilitate the "commission of a major drug offense." Id. at 195, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378. Section 306 of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984 provided for the amendment of the Drug Control Act by adding
§ 881(a)( 7 ), "which provides for the civil forfeiture of a variety of drug-related
property" used or intended to be used in violation of the Drug Control Act. Id.
at 215, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3398.
22. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174.
23. Id. Prior to the 1984 amendment of the Drug Control Act, § 881 only
provided for the forfeiture of property used to manufacture or transport illegal
drugs. S. Rep. 225, supra note 21, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378.
4
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achieved its objective of providing law enforcement officials with a more
potent means to check the ever-swelling tide of drug trafficking in the
United States.
Although such an objective is necessary, the civil forfeiture provi-
sions of the Drug Control Act have had an unsettling impact on state
laws defining marital property.2 4 Tension between the federal and state
laws has arisen and is especially acute in those jurisdictions that recog-
nize tenancy by the entirety.2 5 A tenancy by the entirety is a common
law concept of property ownership unique to married persons, which
deems that each spouse owns an indivisible interest in the whole of
jointly titled property.2 6 This interest is severable only upon the death
of one spouse, divorce or the agreement of both spouses.2 7 Where the
jointly titled property is subject to forfeiture, uncertainty arises with re-
spect to the ownership rights of innocent spouses and the subsequent
Section 881 did not provide for the forfeiture of real property used to store or to
facilitate the manufacture of illegal drugs. Id. Thus, the 1984 amendment of
§ 881 (a) armed law enforcement officials with another weapon to fight the drug
war by subjecting real property to civil forfeiture when it is used in connection
with illegal drug activity. See id.
24. See United States v. 15621 S.W. 109th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1518-19
(1 th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit noted that a tension between the applica-
tion of federal forfeiture laws and state marital property laws arose in jurisdic-
tions recognizing tenancy by the entirety as a form of property ownership for
married couples. Id. at 1519. The court held that state law determines the prop-
erty rights of individuals while federal law operates to effect the punishment of
the wrongdoer under the Drug Control Act. Id. at 1518-19. When a spouse who
holds property in tenancy by the entirety is deemed an innocent owner under
the innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7) of the Drug Control Act, the court
concluded that § 881 (a) (7) barred the forfeiture of any part of the marital prop-
erty because the innocent spouse owned an indivisible interest in the entire
property. Id. at 1512.
For a discussion of the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in 15621 S. W. 209th
Avenue, see infra notes 157-79 and accompanying text.
25. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 180.
26. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 218-19 (2d ed. 1988). Tenancy by the entirety is a common law notion of
property ownership unique to husband and wife which provides forjoint owner-
ship of property with a right of survivorship. Id. The concept provides that
"tenants by the entirety are seized of the whole and not of a share" of property.
Id. To establish a tenancy by the entirety, the four unities of "time, title, interest
and possession" must exist. Id. at 218. An estate held as a tenancy by the en-
tirety cannot be severed unilaterally by one spouse although the spouses may
voluntarily choose to terminate the estate. Id. at 222-23.
Tenancy by the entirety exists in twenty-two states. Id. at 220.. Jurisdictions
that retain tenancy by the entirety as a form of real property ownership include:
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Vir-
ginia and Wyoming. Id. at 220 n. 1.
27. Id. at 222-23. A tenancy by the entirety will be terminated by operation
of law, upon the death of one spouse or divorce. Id.
1992] COMMENT 1491
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disposition of such real property.28
This Comment will focus on § 881 of the Drug Control Act, which
provides for the civil forfeiture of real property used to facilitate illegal
drug transactions in violation of federal law, and its effect on property
owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. This Comment
will provide an overview of the current status of the law with respect to
the ownership rights of an innocent spouse and the rights of the federal
government when federal forfeiture law and state marital property laws
conflict. To accomplish this objective, this Comment will outline the
history of forfeiture law, the general theory underlying the forfeiture
provisions of § 881, and will then review the statutory language of
§ 881. Finally, this Comment will analyze recent decisions which ad-
dress conflicts that arise between forfeiture law and marital property law
when § 881 is used to effect civil forfeiture.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Forfeiture Law
In the United States, the concept of forfeiture has been recognized
"since the adoption of the United States Constitution,"'2 9 and thereafter
has been incorporated into the statutory law.30 There are two types of
statutory forfeiture in the United States: in rem proceedings and in per-
sonam proceedings. 3 ' The former are civil forfeiture proceedings con-
ducted against the offending property regardless of its owner's guilt or
innocence.3 2 The latter are criminal forfeiture proceedings conducted
against a convicted felon's property as punishment for violating the
law.
3 3
28. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 180. Section 881(a)(7),
which provides for forfeiture of real estate, is a relatively new provision which is
still being interpreted by the courts. Id. at 181. The application of § 881(a)(7)
and the resulting seizure of real property are still determined on a fact-specific
basis by the courts. Id. Thus, "it is difficult to predict with any certainty the
future of real property forfeitures" under the statute. Id.
29. Bruce C. Conybeare, Jr., Note, Federal Civil Forfeiture: An Ill-Conceived
Scheme Unfairly Deprives an Innocent Party of Its Property Interest, 62 U. DET. L. REv.
87, 90 (1984).
30. See Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 90-93 (discussing history of for-
feiture laws in United States); see, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1963, 84 Stat. 911, 943 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) forfeiture provision); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (current
version at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988)) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) for-
feiture provision).
31. See Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 324-25.
32. Id. at 325. For a further discussion of in rem forfeiture, see supra notes
3-4 and accompanying text.
33. Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 325. For a further discussion of in
personam forfeiture, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
1492 [Vol. 37: p. 1487
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/6
1992] COMMENT 1493
The origins of both in rem and in personam forfeiture proceedings
can be traced to the English law of forfeiture.3 4 English law provided
for three types of forfeiture: (1) the institution of deodand, (2) the com-
mon law of forfeiture, and (3) statutory forfeiture. 35 The institution of
deodand is an ancient concept based on the Old Testament. 36 Deo-
dands were "objects, including immovable ones, that caused the death
of a human being."' 37 This fiction provided that the instrument of death
was subject to forfeiture as a means of atonement for the loss of human
life.3 8 This concept eventually expanded from the forfeiture of objects
involved in the killing of a human being to objects involved in criminal
activity. 3 9 Such property was subject to forfeiture regardless of its
owner's guilt or innocence.40 The property, as the offending object, was
forfeited to the sovereign and became an additional source of reve-
nue. 4 1 Although England formally abolished the institution of deodand
in 1846, "the concept of forfeiting property involved in illegal activity
continued."'42 Thus, the evolution of the institution of deodand in Eng-
land provided the foundation for the modern institution of in rem
forfeiture.
The second type of forfeiture recognized in England was common-
law forfeiture. 4 3 Common-law forfeitures were in personam actions
conducted subsequent to an individual's conviction for a felony or trea-
son.44 The convicted felon or traitor forfeited all real and personal
34. Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 329.
35. See id. at 326-29.
36. Id. at 326-27. One commentator has noted:
The origins of forfeiture have been traced to one of the Old Testament
laws which God gave to Moses: "[If an ox gore a man or woman, that
they die then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be
eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit."
Id. at 326 (quoting Exodus 21:28 (King James)). The origins of in rem forfeiture
are rooted in this Old Testament passage and reflect the view that the property
itself is guilty of the wrongdoing. Id. at 327.
37. Id. " '[D]eodand' is derived from the Latin term deo dandum, which is
interpreted as a thing to be given to God." Id. at 327 n.22.
38. Id. at 327. The theory underlying the institution of deodand provided
that the property itself committed the offense, and therefore was forfeited to the
sovereign regardless of its owner's guilt or innocence. Id. The property owner
could not recover the property or its value even if the owner was entirely inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. Id.
39. Id. at 328 (citing Regina v. Woodrow, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846)
(upholding forfeiture of goods manufactured in violation of law despite inno-
cent purchaser's lack of knowledge)).
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 90 ("Over time, deodand
evolved from a means for religious expiation to a source of revenue for the sov-
ereign as the offending property, having been used to commit a felony, became
the property of the sovereign.").
42. Hewitt, Comment, supra note 4, at 328.
43. Id.
44. Id. Under English common law, forfeiture could not be effected until a
7
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property to the sovereign as punishment for the criminal activity.
4 5
The third type of forfeiture recognized by English law, statutory
forfeiture, was imposed upon violation of customs and revenue laws.
46
Statutory forfeitures were in rem proceedings, whereby the property it-
self was treated as the offending party and subjected to forfeiture upon
occurrence of a statutory violation.4 7 Thus, the guilt or innocence of
the property owner was not considered.
B. Early Forfeiture Law in the United States
The concept of deodand was not incorporated into the common law
of the United States, however, in rem forfeiture has been incorporated
into federal statutory law since the adoption of the United States Consti-
tution.48 The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
statutory in rem forfeitures are constitutional despite their potential ef-
fect on innocent property owners. 49 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co. ,50 the Supreme Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute that pro-
vided for the seizure and forfeiture of vessels used to transport or facili-
tate the transportation of controlled substances, regardless of the vessel
owner's innocence. 5 1 In Calero-Toledo, the owner of a seized yacht chal-
lenged the constitutional validity of the statute on two grounds. 5 2 First,
the owner contended that such forfeiture was unconstitutional without
prior notice and an adversary hearing to determine the property of the
seizure. 53 The Calero-Toledo Court rejected this line of reasoning and
concluded that the statute was constitutional because it served a signifi-
party had been convicted of a felony or convicted of treason. Id. Once con-
victed, the party's real and personal property was subject to forfeiture. Id. The
justification for in personam forfeiture lay in the notion that a conviction for
treason or felony resulted in a breach of the King's peace which required remu-
neration. Id.
45. Id. at 328 n.35.
46. Id. at 328-29. Statutory forfeitures differed from common-law forfeit-
ures in that the court only considered the wrongful use of the property, i.e., the
forfeitures did not arise upon a conviction of the defendant. Id. at 329.
47. Id.
48. See Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 90 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974)).
In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court traced the development of forfeiture stat-
utes in the United States. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 682-83, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974). The Supreme Court followed the
history of forfeiture from its biblical origins to English common law and then to
its subsequent adoption and proliferation in the United States. Id. at 680-83.
The Calero-Toledo Court also noted that the defense of innocent ownership has
almost always been rejected when forfeiture statutes are violated unless the stat-
ute specifically provides for such a defense. Id. at 683.
49. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
50. 416 U.S. 663, 689-90, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 668.
53. Id. at 668, 676-77.
8
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cant government interest. 54 Second, the owner claimed that the statute
was unconstitutional because it authorized a government taking of prop-
erty without just compensation.5 5 The Supreme Court also rejected this
argument based on the historical background of forfeiture statutes and
precedent establishing their constitutionality.
5 6
In rejecting the arguments in Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court out-
lined the precedent sustaining the validity of statutory in rem forfeiture
as applied to innocent property owners.5 7 The Calero-Toledo Court
noted that the Supreme Court first addressed the validity of statutory in
rem forfeiture in 1827 in The Palmyra.5 8 In that case, the Court held that
54. Id. at 678-80. In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court relied on Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86-87, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972), to reject the vessel
owner's claim that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide
for a pre-seizure notice and hearing. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 677. In Fuentes,
the Supreme Court held that immediate seizure of property is justified in certain
circumstances without a prior notice or a prior hearing. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-
91. Such circumstances arise when:
[S]eizure has been directly necessary to secure an important govern-
mental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control
over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure
has been a government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justi-
fied in the particular instance.
Id. at 91.
In Calero-Toledo, the owner of the vessel, a yacht leasing company, sought a
declaration that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for
pre-seizure notice and hearing. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668. Applying the
Fuentes test to the Puerto Rican statute, the Court concluded that postponement
of a pre-seizure notice and hearing was justified. Id. at 678-79. The Calero-Toledo
Court reasoned that the statute served significant government purpose:
First, seizure ... permits Puerto Rico to assert in ren jurisdiction over
the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby foster-
ing the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the prop-
erty and in enforcing criminal sanctions. Second, preseizure notice and
hearing might frustrate the interests served by the statutes, since the
property seized- as here, a yacht-will often be of a sort that could be
removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance
warning of confiscation were given. And finally, unlike the situation in
Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties; rather,
Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is appropriate
under the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.
Id. at 679.
55. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680. The Supreme Court also rejected this
argument and found "that statutory forfeiture schemes are not rendered uncon-
stitutional because of their applicability to the property interest of" an innocent
owner. Id.
56. Id. The Supreme Court relied on the historical background and prece-
dent of in rem forfeiture which holds the property itself guilty of wrongdoing.
Id. For a further discussion of English forfeiture law, see supra notes 29-47 and
accompanying text.
57. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-85.
58. Id. at 683 (discussing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827)).
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a "conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit
a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression in violation of a federal
statute." 59 The Court based its decision on the historical acceptance of
in rem forfeitures attaching to a guilty object, and not to its owner.60
Thus, The Palmyra Court determined that the in rem forfeiture of a vessel
was proper despite the innocence of its owner. 6 ' The Court further
opined that a "proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly un-
affected by any criminal proceeding in personam."62
To provide additional support for the proposition that the innocent
owner defense has long been insufficient to negate the effect of a statu-
tory in rem proceeding, the Calero-Toledo Court relied upon the nine-
teenth century case of Dobbins' Distillery v. United States.63 In Dobbins'
Distillery, an innocent lessor was forced to forfeit all real and personal
property to the government pursuant to an in rem statutory forfeiture
law. 64 The Dobbins' Distillery Court found that the statutory violation "at-
tached primarily to the distillery ... without any regard whatsoever to
the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner, beyond what
necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property to the distil-
ler, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the lessee [distiller] as a
distillery."'6 5 The Calero-Toledo Court emphasized that decisions sup-
porting this proposition have continued into this century.
66
Based on the extensive precedent and common-law tradition, the
Calero-Toledo Court found the forfeiture of the yacht involved in illegal
activity constitutional under the Puerto Rican statute.6 7 The Court con-
59. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827).
60. Id. at 14. ("The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the of-
fense be malum prohibitum, or malum in se.").
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685-86 (dis-
cussing Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 397 (1878), reh'g denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974).
64. Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 421, 400-02 (1878). The
lessor was forced to forfeit real and personal property used by the lessee in vio-
lation of revenue laws. Id. at 402-04. The lessee had failed to keep the proper
records with respect to the distillery, thereby violating a federal revenue statute.
Id. at 396.
65. Id. at 401.
66. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 685; see, e.g., van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
465, 467-68 (1926) (holding that state liquor prohibition law providing for for-
feiture of innocent owner's automobile not violative of Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921)
(holding that federal tax-fraud forfeiture statutes providing for forfeiture of in-
nocent owner's property not violative of Fifth Amendment).
67. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686. In Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court
found that the statute served significant government interests by "preventing
further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty,
thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable." Id. at 687.
1496 [Vol. 37: p. 1487
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cluded that the imposition of such a harsh economic penalty not only
served the punitive and deterrent purposes underlying the statute, but
also encouraged further vigilance by inducing property owners to "exer-
cise greater care in transferring possession of their property."'6 8 Thus,
the Calero-Toledo Court validated the application of statutory in rem for-
feiture proceedings against innocent owners of property.
In contrast to civil forfeiture, "criminal forfeiture traditionally [has
not been] part of American law." '69 It was not until 1970 that Congress
enacted two statutes providing for criminal forfeiture. 70 These statutes
allow the government to conduct in personam proceedings against a
criminal defendant. 7 1 The availability of forfeiture of property owned
by the criminal defendant, however, is conditioned upon a conviction
for the underlying substantive offense.
72
In summary, the present American law of forfeiture can be traced to
the English law of forfeiture. American civil in rem forfeiture proceed-
ings are incorporated as part of statutory law, and have been validated
through case law. Civil in rem forfeiture, like its English predecessor, is
conducted solely against the offending object and not against its
owner. 73 Also, again similar to English precedent, criminal in personam
forfeiture depends upon the conviction of the criminal defendant before
the subject property can be seized.
7 4
C. Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Control Act
1. Interpretation and Application of § 881
The following overview will explore the relevant provisions of § 881
of the Drug Control Act and provide the reader with a reference point
from which to evaluate the case law interpreting the forfeiture of marital
property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Drug Control Act to reduce illegal
68. Id. at 688.
69. Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 92.
70. Id. at 92 & n.50. In 1970, Congress enacted two statutes that'included
criminal forfeiture provisions: (1) the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1963 84 Stat. 922, 943 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) forfeiture provision); and (2) the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-
66 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988)) (Continuing Crime Enterprise
(CCE) forfeiture provision). See also Maxeiner, supra note 4, at 768 n.6, 792-93
(noting that Congress expected these forfeitures to be part of criminal
prosecution).
71. Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 93.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 91. For a further discussion of in rem forfeiture, see supra
notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
74. See Conybeare, Note, supra note 29, at 92-93. For a further discussion
of in personam forfeiture, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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drug trade and to encourage the rehabilitation of drug abusers. 75 To
attain its goal, Congress included a civil forfeiture provision-§ 881.76
Section 881 attempts to remove the economic incentive from illegal
drug activity by providing for in rem forfeiture of specific types of prop-
erty. 77 Under the relation-back provision 78 of § 881, title in the for-
feited property vests in the United States government immediately upon
a substantive violation of the Drug Control Act. 79 This provision en-
ables the government to seize the subject property at the moment it is
used to facilitate a violation of the Drug Control Act. 80 The forfeiture
occurs regardless of whether its owner is convicted of a substantive of-
fense under the Drug Control Act. 8 1
The seizure of property is constitutional because the statute codifies
the legal fiction of in rem forfeiture.8 2 In rem forfeiture provides that
75. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174; see also Sean D. Smith,
Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 303 (1988) (discussing use of 21
U.S.C. § 853 forfeiture provisions to stem "the growing menace of drug abuse
in the United States" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567)).
76. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174. As enacted, the civil
forfeiture provisions of the Drug Control Act in § 881 reached only certain types
of property used to manufacture and to transport illegal drugs. Id. Section 881,
however, was subsequently amended in 1978 and again in 1984 to extend the
reach of the civil forfeiture provisions to property and proceeds furnished in
exchange for illegal drugs and to real property used in connection with illegal
drug transactions. Id.
77. See id.; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h). Section 881(h) provides: "All right, title, and in-
terest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the
United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this sec-
tion." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. Section 881 (h) is the codification of the relation-back doctrine. The
relation-back doctrine deems property subject to forfeiture at the moment of the
violation of the Drug Control Act. See Anton R. Valukas & Thomas P. Walsh,
Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You Can't Take It With You, 14 LITIG. 31, 36
(1988); see also United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1536
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding home subject to forfeiture at moment defendant made
cocaine sale), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1511 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Landman & Hieronymus,
supra note 1, at 176 (indicating that relation-back doctrine vests title in govern-
ment at moment when property used in prohibited manner).
80. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (d).
81. See, e.g., U.S. v. One Rural Lot, 739 F. Supp. 74, 77 (D.P.R. 1990) (hold-
ing that civil forfeiture is not contingent upon criminal conviction of property
owner; civil forfeiture is based on legal fiction that seized property guilty of
wrongdoing).
82. See United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting that forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) is in rem proceeding based on legal
fiction of property as wrongdoer), cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. U.S., 111 S. Ct.
1414 (1991); see also Valukas & Walsh, supra note 79, at 36 (citing Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977
(1974)) (holding that statutory in rem forfeiture schemes constitutional when
applied to property interests of innocents); Parcels, supra note 9, at 442 (noting
12
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the subject property is guilty of the wrongdoing, and therefore can be
seized by the government upon a showing of probable cause.8 3 An in-
nocent owner, however, is not without recourse because § 881 includes
a statutory defense for innocent owners whose property is subject to
seizure.
84
The scope of § 881 has evolved since its enactment. When the
Drug Control Act was enacted in 1970, forfeiture under § 881 was lim-
ited to the seizure of vehicles, equipment and raw materials used to facil-
itate felony drug violations.8 5 By 1984, however, § 881 had been
amended to include § 881 (a) (7), which provides for the forfeiture of real
property.8 6 Pursuant to subsection 881(a)(7), the real property that is
subject to forfeiture is "real property ...used to facilitate any felony
drug violation" of the Drug Control Act. 87 As a result, law enforcement
officials have the authority to seize real property under an in rem pro-
ceeding at the moment the felony drug violation occurs.
8 8
In order to invoke the forfeiture provisions of § 881(a)(7), the gov-
ernment need only demonstrate that probable cause exists to believe
that the subject property was used in violation of the Drug Control
Act.8 9 In United States v. 28 Emery Street,90 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit stated that "[p]robable cause to forfeit [real
property] requires only a 'reasonable ground for belief of guilt[,] sup-
ported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion' that
the property is subject to forfeiture." 9 1 The First Circuit further noted
that constitutional protection not available to innocent property owners against
in rem forfeiture).
83. See, e.g., United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990).
For a discussion of in rem forfeiture, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
84. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). In pertinent part, § 881(a)(7) provides:
"[E]xcept that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of
that owner." Id.
85. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174.
86. For details of the amendments, see supra notes 16-23 and accompany-
ing text.
87. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174; see also Jankowski,
Note, supra note 13, at 170-71. For the full text of§ 881(a)(7), see supra note 12.
88. See United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) ("One of
the most powerful weapons in the government's arsenal in the continuing 'war'
on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of property that is used for or
facilitates violations of the drug laws."); see also Jankowski, Note, supra note 13, at
170 (Congress passed Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 to enhance statu-
tory civil forfeiture mechanisms that were traditionally plagued by limitations
and ambiguities).
89. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d at 3 (citing United States v. $250,000 in United
States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir. 1987)).
90. 914 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 3; see also Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 177 (stating
that "[p]robable cause must be judged not with clinical detachment but with a
common sense view to the realities of normal life").
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that once the government demonstrates probable cause, the "burden
shifts to the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property was not used in violation of the statute or it was so used
without the owner's knowledge or consent."' 92 Therefore, while the lan-
guage of § 881 (a)(7) provides for the civil forfeiture of property used to
violate federal narcotics laws, it also provides a defense of innocence for
the owner who can demonstrate that the property was not used in viola-
tion of federal narcotics laws, or that he or she did not know of or con-
sent to such activity.
93
Two predominant questions of interpretation arise with respect to
two clauses in § 881(a) (7). The first question concerns the interpreta-
tion of the term "facilitate" in determining whether the property was
"used to facilitate any drug felony violation."194 The second involves the
scope of the innocent owner defense incorporated in § 881(a)(7).
9 5
Although the courts are split, judicial interpretation of the clauses pro-
vides some insight into the meaning of the statutory language in
§ 881 (a)(7).
2. When Does Property "Facilitate" a Felony Drug Violation?
Judicial consideration of the term "facilitate" has yielded two pre-
dominant lines of case law. 96 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First and Fourth Circuits have concluded that there must be a "sub-
stantial connection" between the forfeited property and the illegal drug
activity. In United States v. One Parcel of Real Property,9 7 the First Circuit
concluded that the affidavits of a government drug enforcement official
alleging the existence of drugs, drug paraphernalia and cash on the
property established a "substantial connection" between the property
and the drug trafficking, thus rendering the claimants' home
92. Emery St., 914 F.2d at 3 (citing United States v. 5 Bell Rock Road, 896
F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (innocent
owner defense); United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 913-
14 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); see also Parcels, Comment, supra note 9, at 440
(discussing procedure available to establish innocent ownership). The govern-
ment has the initial burden to establish probable cause. Id. at 441. Probable
cause is found when "the facts support a reasonable belief that the property has
been used in violation of the Drug Control Act." Id. at 441-42. Once the gov-
ernment establishes probable cause, the property owner can rebut the charge
with a showing of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 442.
94. See Parcels, Comment, supra note 9, at 443 (discussing interpretation of
§ 881(a)(7) language).
95. See id.
96. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 178. Despite the differing
judicial interpretations of the term "facilitate," the "resolution of the question
of whether real property has been used to facilitate an underlying drug offense
focuses on the degree of the property's involvement in the criminal activity and
is a question of fact." Id.
97. 900 F.2d 470 (lst Cir. 1990).
14




In United States v. Schifferli,99 the Fourth Circuit also adopted the
"substantial connection" test, but cautioned that the property could
only be rendered forfeitable under § 881(a)(7) if its connection to the
illegal drug activity was "ja]t minimum ... more than incidental or for-
tuitous."1 0 0 The Fourth Circuit found the property in question, a den-
tist's office, substantially connected to illegal drug activity, thus
rendering it forfeitable under § 881(a)(7). 10 1 The dentist's office was
deemed forfeitable because it was the situs from which controlled sub-
stances were dispensed and distributed in violation of the Drug Control
Act. 102
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also
adopted the "substantial connection" test to find property forfeitable
under § 881(a)(7). 10 3 In United States v. 3639-2nd Street, N.E., 10 4 the
Eighth Circuit concluded that a home was subject to forfeiture under
§ 881(a)(7) due to its availability for illegal drug activity and the pres-
ence of drug paraphernalia, both of which facilitated the sale of cocaine
98. Id. at 472. The First Circuit adopted the "substantial connection" test
to determine whether real property was subject to forfeiture pursuant to the
language of § 881 (a)(7). Id. Forfeiture under this test required that the govern-
ment demonstrate that the property played an instrumental role in facilitating
the violation of the Drug Control Act. Id. The First Circuit found that the test
had been satisfied by affidavits alleging that there was a substantial amount of
cocaine on the premises, along with other drug paraphernalia and a large sum of
cash. Id. Thus, the First Circuit concluded that a "substantial connection" ex-
isted between the real property and illegal drug activity so as to render the prop-
erty forfeitable under § 881(a)(7). Id.
99. 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 990. For a further discussion of the "substantial connection"
test, see supra note 98.
101. Id. at 991. In Schifferli, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the subject
property was forfeitable under § 881 (a)(7) because it had been used to facilitate
a violation of the Drug Control Act. Id. The court interpreted the term "facili-
tate" to mean "that the property need only make the prohibited conduct 'less
difficult or more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.' " Id. at 990 (quot-
ing United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989)). In
Schifferli, a dentist illegally dispensed and distributed controlled substances to
eight individuals from the subject property over a period of four months. Id. at
991. The Fourth Circuit found that the dentist's office played an instrumental
role in the violation because it "was actually used in the course of his crimes"
and "it provided an air of legitimacy and protection from outside scrutiny." Id.
Thus, the property was held forfeitable under § 881(a)(7). Id.
102. Id. at 990.
103. See United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989).
In 3639-2nd Street, the Eighth Circuit held that the use of real property to actu-
ally commit and facilitate the sale of cocaine sufficed to render a "substantial
connection" between the property and the illegal activity. Id. at 1097. In its
analysis, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the availability of the home as a situs
for illegal drug activity coupled with the presence of drug paraphernalia on the
premises established a sufficient nexus between the property and the illegal drug
use to justify forfeiture under § 881(a)(7). Id. at 1096-97.
104. 869 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1989).
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on the premises.10 5
Other courts have construed the term "facilitate" more broadly. In
United States v. 916 Douglas Avenue, 10 6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that a "substantial connection" between the
real property and the illegal drug activity is not required to render the
property forfeitable.' 0 7 Instead, the Seventh Circuit found that the gov-
ernment need merely "demonstrate that the nexus is more than inciden-
tal or fortuitous."' 0 8 In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the
plain language of the statute which provides that property is subject to
forfeiture when it "is used in any manner or part to commit or to facili-
tate the commission of a drug related offense."' 1 9 In support of its con-
clusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that a broad interpretation of the
statute was consistent with the overall purpose of the Drug Control Act,
which seeks to eradicate illicit drug activity and trade in the United
States.Il0 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit found that the underlying
transaction between the federal agent and the claimant, which occurred
on the claimant's property, was more than incidental or fortuitous. I''
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the harsh nature of the penalty of
forfeiture, but concluded that it was justified by the language and pur-
pose of the statute.' 12
3. How Does an Innocent Owner Defend His or Her Property?
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the term "facilitate,"
there is also uncertainty associated with the innocent owner defense in
§ 881(a)(7).11 3 The statute protects an innocent owner's property from
forfeiture if the innocent owner establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the subject property was not used to facilitate an illegal
drug transaction, or that the subject property was used "without the
105. Id. at 1097-98.
106. 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Born v. United States,
Ill S. Ct. 1090 (1991).
107. Id. at 494.
108. Id.
109. Id. In the Seventh Circuit, the government need only demonstrate a
nexus, rather than a substantial connection, between the property and the illegal
drug activity. Id.
110. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 493. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
grafting the requirement of a substantial connection between the subject prop-
erty and the illegal activity unnecessarily frustrated the congressional scheme.
Id. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the purpose of § 881 was to provide
drug enforcement officials with a powerful weapon to eradicate illegal drug ac-
tivity in the United States. Id. Thus, any unnecessary judicial restriction on in-
terpretation of the statutory language would defeat the goal underlying the
Drug Control Act. Id.
111. Id. at 494.
112. Id. at 494-95.
113. For the text of the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(7), see supra
note 12.
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knowledge or consent of that owner."" 4 Some courts have held that an
innocent owner must establish both a lack of knowledge and a lack of
consent before the innocent owner defense can be employed to avoid
forfeiture under § 881 (a)(7).1 15 Other courts, however, have held that a
claimant may rely on the defense of innocent ownership by establishing
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent to the prohibited activity. 1 6
In United States v. Lot 111-B, 1 7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the innocent owner defense is only avail-
able to those owners who prove both lack of knowledge and lack of con-
sent. 1 8 The Ninth Circuit based its decision upon an interpretation of
the policy and legislative history of the Drug Control Act.' 19
114. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); see also Landman & Hieronymus, supra
note 1, at 180.
115. See United States v. Lot 111 -B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) ("The intent of the forfeiture provision is to seize all property that
has a 'substantial connection' to the illegal drug activity. This policy would be
substantially undercut if persons . . . fully aware of the illegal connection or
source of their property were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent
owners.' "); see also United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 916
(S.D. Fla. 1989). In Certain Real Property, the district court stated: "It is enough,
under the statute, that the owner establish that the proscribed act was commit-
ted 'without the knowledge or consent of that owner.' " Id. at 916. The Certain
Real Property court further held that the statute does not require the claimants to
demonstrate that they did all they could to prevent the prohibited use of the
property to rely on the innocent owner defense. Id. Rather, the "claimant must
establish that he did not know of, nor consent to, the proscribed use of defend-
ant property." Id. at 914.
116. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 877 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that although language of § 881 (a)( 7 ) is "confusing," definition of "con-
sent" mandates interpretation that innocent ownship can be established by
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991);
see also United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626, reh 'g denied, 890 F.2d
659 (3d Cir. 1989)) (holding that the district court erred by concluding that the
owner lost her property because she failed to prove lack of knowledge without
considering whether lack of consent was present).
117. 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. Id. at 1445. In Lot I1-B, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the innocent
owner defense was unavailable to the claimant because he was aware of illegal
drug trade on the subject property. Id. The claimant argued that the innocent
owner defense was available if he had no knowledge of the illegal activities or if
he did not consent to the illegal activities. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
claimant's interpretation and affirmed the lower court decision which held that
the innocent owner defense was available only to those owners proving both lack
of knowledge and lack of consent. Id.; see also 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626.
119. Lot llI-B, 902 F.2d at 1445. The Ninth Circuit noted that the legisla-
tive history of § 881(a)(7) does not provide much guidance on the issue. Id.
The Ninth Circuit, however, reviewed the legislative history of § 881(a)(6),
which explained language identical to that in § 881(a)(7). Id. The legislative
history of § 881 (a)(6) indicated that Congress intended that the innocent owner
defense be available only to those property owners who could prove both lack of
knowledge and lack of consent to the illicit use of the property. Id.
The congressional joint committee report provides in pertinent part: "Spe-
cifically the property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such
17
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In contrast, the Second Circuit has held that a property owner may
avoid forfeiture by proving either lack of knowledge or lack of consent
to the prohibited use of the property.' 20 In United States v. 141st Street
Corp. '121 the Second Circuit recognized that the language of the statute
provides for two alternative interpretations. 12 2 First, the court noted
that the use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that a claimant can success-
fully assert the defense of innocent ownership by proving either lack of
knowledge or lack of consent. 12 3 Second, the Second Circuit noted that
the placement of the preposition "without" before the phrase "knowl-
edge or consent" suggests that the defense is available only to those
owners who can prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent.
124
The Second Circuit adopted the first interpretation, which requires
that owners asserting the defense prove either lack of knowledge or lack
of consent.' 2 5 The Second Circuit based its decision upon the fact that
Congress included the innocent ownership defense to preclude the un-
just punishment of innocent owners by the imposition of the penalty of
forfeiture. 12 6 Despite this conclusion, the Second Circuit stated that a
property knew or consented to the [illegal conduct]." Joint House-Senate Ex-
planation of Senate Amendment, 124 CONG. REc. 34670, 34672 (1978).
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a logical reading of the statutory lan-
guage of § 881(a)(7) would make the innocent owner defense available only to
those parties who could prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent. Lot
11-B, 902 F.2d at 1445.
120. See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878; see also United States v. One 107.9
Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that innocent
owner defense available to claimants who prove either lack of knowledge or lack
of consent to illicit drug activity); 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 626 (finding that
claimant can demonstrate innocent ownership by showing, by a preponderance
of evidence, that illegal use of property occurred either without claimant's
knowledge or without claimant's consent).
121. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1990).
122. Id. at 878.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that the definition of the word "con-
sent" implies that one must have knowledge before consent can be given. Id.
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that if "a claimant's knowledge alone pre-
cludes the innocent owner defense (i.e., that a claimant must disprove both
knowledge and consent), then 'consent' as used in the statute would be totally
unnecessary." Id.
126. Id.; see alsoJankowski, Note, supra note 13, at 175 (noting congressional
concern with impact of seizure provisions on innocent parties). In enacting
§ 881(a)(7), Congress included the innocent owner defense to circumvent the
harsh effects of civil in rem forfeiture. Id. Although § 881(a)(7) includes the
defense for innocent owners, the relation-back provision in § 881 (h) does not
include an analogous defense. Id. at 175-77. This inconsistency can lead to
harsh results for the innocent owner despite the protection in § 881(a)(7). Id.
Under § 881 (h), a subsequent purchaser of property is not afforded any protec-
tion because the property is considered forfeited to the government at the mo-
ment of the wrongdoing. Id. at 176-77. Thus, a subsequent purchaser cannot
rely on § 881(a)(7) because § 881(h) states that title vests in the government
upon a violation of the Drug Control Act. Id. at 177. The inconsistency between
1504 [Vol. 37: p. 1487
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property owner, relying on a lack of consent to prove innocent owner-
ship, must demonstrate that he or she "did all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the illegal activity once he [or she] learned of it." 
12 7
In its holding, the Second Circuit concluded that the property in 141st
Street Corp. was subject to forfeiture because the owner failed to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent the drug trafficking that occurred both in the
common areas of the building and in one-third of all the apartments in
the building. 1
28
4. Seizure of Forfeited Property Under Section 881(b)
Once the government establishes that the property is subject to for-
§ 881(a)(7) and § 881(h) has the potential to lead to inequitable results for
property purchasers depending upon when the property is purchased. See id.
For example, "[tihe purchaser who buys the day before [the wrongdoing] is fully
protected, while the subsequent purchaser has absolutely no protection." Id.
Thus, the relation-back provision in § 881 (h) lends uncertainty to the domain of
property law. Id. "Even the most diligent purchaser [cannot] fully protect him-
self because no records would indicate prior illegal activity." Id. Therefore, an
innocent purchaser of property would have no relief from a forfeiture demand
by the government which was based on an illegal use prior to the purchase. Id.
This results because the property retains the taint of illegal use despite the sale
to an innocent purchaser. See id.
127. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879. The Second Circuit based its decision
on the holding in Calero-Toledo which provided that forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property might be unconstitutional if the owner had taken action to pre-
vent the illegal use of the property upon learning of it. Id. Although the courts
are split on the issue of whether to incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard into
§ 881 (a)(7), the Second Circuit adopted it. See id. But cf. United States v. Certain
Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (rejecting application of
third prong of Calero-Toledo test to innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7) and
distinguishing Puerto Rican statute in Calero-Toledo because it did not include
innocent owner defense). The Second Circuit concluded that the Calero-Toledo
standard applied to § 881(a)(7) because "it provides a balance between the two
congressional purposes of making drug trafficking prohibitively expensive for
the property owner and preserving the property of an innocent owner." 141st
St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
128. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 881. In reaching its conclusion, the Second
Circuit relied on Calero-Toledo, noting that courts adopting this standard do so on
the premise that Congress intended to incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard
into § 881(a)(7). Id. at 879.
By comparison, courts that reject this standard argue that Congress would
have expressly incorporated it into the statutory language of § 881(a)(7) if that
were the congressional intent. Id. Furthermore, courts rejecting this line of rea-
soning argue that the statute in question in Calero-Toledo did not include an inno-
cent owner defense. See United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five
Thousand Dollars, 762 F.2d 895, 906 n.24 (1 th Cir. 1985) (leaving for another
time the applicability of Calero-Toledo dicta to forfeiture actions under
§ 881 (a)(6)), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); see alsoJankowski, Note, supra note
13, at 190-91 (noting that absence of innocent defense in Puerto Rican statute
diminished usefulness of Calero-Toledo in § 881 cases). Thus, the Second Circuit
concluded that "defining 'consent' in section 881 (a)(7), as the failure to take all
reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge
of the use is entirely appropriate." 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
19
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feiture, and the property owner fails to prove that the property was not
used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction or fails to establish innocent
ownership, the government must utilize forfeiture mechanisms in
§ 881(b) of the Drug Control Act to effect the seizure of the property
used to facilitate the prohibited activity.
129
Section 881(b) authorizes the commencement of forfeiture pro-
ceedings in one of two ways.' 30 First, when the government lacks prob-
able cause to believe that the property was used in violation of the Drug
Control Act, forfeiture may be commenced by the Attorney General
pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims (Admiralty and Maritime Rules).1 3 ' The Admiralty and Mari-
time Rules allow the seizure of property upon the filing of a verified
129. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). Section 881(b) provides:
Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United States under this
subchapter may be seized by the Attorney General upon process issued
pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims by any district court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion over the property, except that seizure without such process may be
made when-
(1) the seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search
warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection
warrant;
(2) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior
judgment in favor of the United States in a criminal injunction or
forfeiture proceeding under this subchapter;
(3) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(4) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property is subject to civil forfeiture under this subchapter.
In the event of seizure pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) of this subsec-
tion, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted
promptly.
The Government may request the issuance of a warrant authoriz-
ing the seizure of property subject to forfeiture under this section in the
same manner as provided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Id.
130. See id. Sections 881(b)(1) and (2) authorize the government to com-
mence forfeiture proceedings under the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims. Id. Sections 881(b)(3) and (4) provide that forfeiture
should be effected under the United States Customs law on forfeiture which is
incorporated in § 881(d). See generally id. § 881(b), (d).
131. If forfeiture commences under the Admiralty and Maritime Rules, the
rules provide that a verified complaint be filed. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. RULES
(C)(2). The verified complaint and any supporting documentation must then be
reviewed by the district court where the property is located to determine
whether probable cause exists for in rem forfeiture. FED. R.Civ. P. Supp. RULES
(C)(2)-(3). If probable cause exists, the clerk of the court is authorized to issue a
warrant for service by the Marshal. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. RULES (C)(3). An ex-
ception to the pre-seizure hearing requirement arises when the United States
seeks forfeiture for federal statutory violations. Id. Under such circumstances,
the clerk of the court is authorized to issue a summons and warrant for seizure
upon the filing of a verified complaint. Id.
[Vol. 37: p. 14871506
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complaint and a warrant of arrest in rem. 132 Second, when probable
cause exists to believe that the property has been used to facilitate a
violation of the Drug Control Act, the Attorney General may seize prop-
erty. 133 Such seizure is effected through proceedings set out in
§ 881(d), which incorporates the United States Customs forfeiture law
(Customs Law).1
3 4
Whether the Attorney General proceeds under the Admiralty and
Maritime Rules or the Customs forfeiture law to effect the seizure of real
property, the Constitution requires, at a minimum, an ex parte pre-
seizure hearing to ensure that the government has not used unreasona-
ble or unconstitutional means to seize the real property.' 3 5 An excep-
tion to this rule has been judicially recognized when exigent
circumstances exist.' 3 6 The exception allows for seizure prior to a judi-
cial hearing when there is danger that the "res" may disappear. 137
However, "[w]here the property is large and immovable (e.g., land and
buildings thereon), and the likelihood of it being concealed or destroyed
is remote, there is no overriding need for 'prompt action' which would
sacrifice the property owner's rights to procedural due process."' 3 8
132. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. RULES (C)(3).
133. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (4); see also United States v. 124 East North Ave.,
651 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (N.D. I11. 1987) (indicating that two paths are available
for securing a warrant for seizure of property used to facilitate violation of Drug
Control Act-Admiralty and Maritime Rule C or § 881 (b)(4), which incorporates
the U.S. Customs laws).
134. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d). Section 881(d) provides in pertinent part:
[E]xcept that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or
any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property
under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and
forfeitures of property under this subchapter by such officers, agents,
or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose
by the Attorney General, except to the extent that such duties arise
from seizures and forfeitures effected by any customs officer.
Id.
135. See 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. at 1353. The 124 East North Ave-
nue court noted that a pre-seizure judicial hearing is not "required and is ex-
pressly exempted under Admiralty and Maritime Rule (C)(3)" and under 21
U.S.C. § 881(b). Id. Nonetheless, the 124 East North Avenue court recognized
that an exception to this rule exists when the government seizes real property.
Id. at 1356.
136. Id. at 1355. The 124 East North Avenue court recognized that in some
instances exigent circumstances might exist and would preclude a pre-seizure
judicial hearing. Id. Such a hearing would "frustrate the interests served by the
statute," and would defeat government efforts to eradicate illegal drug traffick-
ing. Id. The 124 East North Avenue court noted, however, that exigent circum-
stances do not typically exist when the subject property is real estate since there
is little or "no likelihood of [real estate] being concealed or destroyed." Id.
137. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (noting that in some cases
the danger that goods would disappear or be destroyed would be sufficient to
justify seizure of goods without notice and opportunity to be heard).
138. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. at 1355 (quoting United States v.
4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (S.D. Fla. 1985)). In United
States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, the district court held that the "Fifth Amend-
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Thus, the case law provides that no seizure of real property should com-
mence unless a warrant is issued by a judicial officer who has reviewed
the complaint to determine whether probable cause exists to require
forfeiture of the property.1
3 9
ment forbids the Attorney General from seizing real property under the drug
forfeiture statute and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims, absent exigent circumstances, without prior judicial review."
United States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (S.D. Fla.
1985).
In 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, the United States Department ofJustice initiated
forfeiture proceedings pursuant to a verified complaint to seize real property
located in Florida. Id. at 1493. The 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway court deemed the
verified complaint defective because it failed to include objective facts support-
ing the government's claim that the property had been used in violation of the
federal narcotics laws. Id. at 1494. The 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway court held that
the defect was of "constitutional proportions which invalidate[d] the seizure
process ab initio." Id. at 1495.
In its analysis, the 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway court relied on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Id. In Sniadach, the Supreme Court held
that a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment law amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42. Similarly, the Fuentes Court struck
down Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes that enabled creditors to effect
forfeiture without prior judicial review. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96. The Fuentes
Court also noted, however, that exigent circumstances may arise that preclude
prior judicial review. Id. at 90-91. To determine the constitutionality of seizure,
the Fuentes Court articulated a three-prong test. The test questions: (1) whether
seizure is necessary to protect "an important government interest or general
public interest"; (2) "whether a special need for prompt action exists"; and
(3) "whether the government has used reasonable force to effect the seizure."
Id. at 91.
Applying the Fuentes logic to the facts of the case before it, the 4880 S.E.
Dixie Highway court determined that seizure was unconstitutional because no exi-
gent circumstances existed. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. at 1498. The
4880 S.E. Dixie Highway court noted that it was extremely unlikely that the real
property in question would disappear. Id. at 1496; cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) (holding seizure of yacht without
prior judicial review constitutional, in part, because yacht could be removed
from jurisdiction).
139. 124 East North Ave., 651 F. Supp. at 1356. In 124 East North Avenue, the
court reviewed the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings were commenced
under § § 881 (a)(7) and (b)(4) to seize a home allegedly used in violation of fed-
eral narcotics laws. Id. at 1352-53. The property owner contended that the pro-
cedures instituted by the government violated the Fifth Amendment because
there was no pre-seizure notice of hearing. Id. at 1354. Although § 881(b)(4)
enables the Attorney General to commence forfeiture proceedings upon show-
ing of probable cause, this authority is subject to further scrutiny when real
property is seized. Id. at 1353. At a minimum, the 124 East North Avenue court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires pre-seizure
judicial review before real property is seized, absent exigent circumstances. Id.
at 1356. Thus, the 124 East North Avenue court granted the property owner's
motion to quash the warrant for seizure. Id. However, the 124 East North Avenue
court further ordered that the clerk reissue the in rem arrest warrant for the
property because probable cause to seize the property existed in the govern-
ment's complaint. Id.
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The procedures outlined above describe the formal process of
transferring the forfeited property to the government. In actuality, the
relation-back doctrine, codified in § 881(h) of the Drug Control Act,
provides that the property involved in the illegal act is subject to forfei-
ture immediately upon the commission of the act. 140 At the moment the
property is involved in the illegal drug activity, "[a]ll right, title, and
interest in the [forfeitable] property . . . shall vest in the United
States."' 4 ' The purpose of this provision is to preclude the transfer of
forfeitable property via transactions that "were not conducted at arm's
length."' 142 Section 881(h), however, does not include an innocent
owner defense. 143 Thus, the section prohibits subsequent transfers of
the forfeitable property which are undertaken to escape the reach of the
government's valid in rem proceedings, but it fails to protect transac-




A. The Conflicts Between Civil Forfeiture Law and State
Marital Property Law
The application of the legal fiction of in rem forfeiture incorporated
into § 881 gives rise to uncertainty when the doctrine is applied to real
property located in a jurisdiction that recognizes tenancy by the entirety
as a form of property ownership. 145 In cases where the government
commences in rem forfeiture proceedings against real property owned
by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, there is no uniform rule
of law governing the subsequent disposition of such property when one
of the spouses is an innocent owner.' 46 The following overview of the
current case law will provide the reader with some insight as to the logic
applied by the courts when faced with the task of reconciling the forfei-
ture of real property under § 881 and state marital property law.
In some jurisdictions, courts have held that no portion of the sub-
ject property is forfeitable as long as the tenancy by the entirety remains
intact. 14 7 In contrast, other courts have held that the entireties estate is
140. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988). For the text of the relation-back doctrine
codified in § 881 (h), see supra note 78.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
142. Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 176.
143. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(h). Thus, innocent owners may have to forfeit
property to the government pursuant to § 881(h) despite the defense incorpo-
rated in § 881 (a)(7). SeeJankowski, Note, supra note 13, at 175-77. For a further
discussion of the inconsistencies between § 881(h) and § 881(a)(7), see supra
note 126.
144. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 174.
145. See id. at 180; see also Valukas & Walsh, supra note 79, at 36.
146. See Landman & Hieronymus, supra note 1, at 180.
147. See, e.g., United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1512
1992] COMMENT 1509
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severable upon a violation of the Drug Control Act.1 48 In the latter ju-
risdictions, the government is entitled to the property interest of the
spouse who allegedly used the property in violation of federal narcotics
laws. 149 A third judicial approach allows the innocent spouse to retain
the property during the course of his or her life, with the property for-
feited to the government upon the innocent spouse's death.'
50
Recently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh,
Sixth and Third Circuits have considered the conflict that arises through
the application of the civil forfeiture provisions of § 881(a)(7) to real
property owned by spouses as tenants by the entirety when one spouse
is an innocent owner. There is a split among these circuits as to how this
conflict should be resolved because neither the statutory language of
§ 88 1(a)(7) nor its legislative history provides any guidance. 15'
(11 th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit held that no property held by husband
and wife as tenants by the entirety could be forfeited under § 881(a) (7) as long
as the tenancy by the entirety remained intact. Id. at 1512. In 15621 S. W. 209th
Avenue, the husband was convicted of drug trafficking and the government filed a
forfeiture proceeding against the entireties property. Id. The court noted that
"reading subsection (h) of section 881 in tandem with subsection (a), it becomes
clear that the 'right, title and interest' . . . vests in the United States upon com-
mission of the unlawful act." Id. at 1516. The court, however, concluded that
the government could not seize the property because such seizure would result
in a taking of the wife's property without just compensation. Id. The court rea-
soned that Congress could not have intended to penalize the wife for her hus-
band's wrongdoing when enacting § 881(a)(7), and thus found that the wife
retained an undivided interest in the whole property that could not be forfeited.
Id.;see also United States v. 11885 S.W. 46th St., 751 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (holding that property held by husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety not subject to forfeiture where innocent spouse had no knowledge of
and did not consent to illegal use); cf United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910
F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 1990) (disapproving of United States v. One Parcel of
Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46th St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 360 (S.D. Fla. 1989), and
holding innocent spouse retains her interest in entireties estate while entireties
intact but government acquires lien on guilty spouse's interest to be satisfied
upon severance of entireties estate), cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991).
148. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46th
St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 360 (S.D. Fla. 1989). In One Parcel of Real Estate, the court
applied § 881(h) in conjunction with § 881(a)(7) to conclude that a violation of
the Drug Control Act converted the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in
common, resulting in the government and the wife each owning a one-half share
of the property. Id. at 360. Under § 881 (h), the court found that the tenancy by
the entirety was destroyed at the moment of the wrongdoing. Id. However, be-
cause the drug dealer's wife satisfied her burden of proof under the innocent
owner defense in § 881(a)(7), the court found that the government assumed the
ownership interest formerly held by the husband, and the government and the
wife became co-tenants. Id. Each was "deemed to have a one-half interest in the
property." Id. at 358.
149. Id. at 359-60.
150. See United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir.
1991).
151. Id. at 76 (noting that "the statutory language does not clearly reveal
what, if any, interest ... is susceptible to forfeiture").
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/6
The Eleventh Circuit has recently held that none of the property
held as tenants by the entirety can be subject to forfeiture because an
innocent spouse owns an indivisible interest in the entire estate.' 52 By
way of comparison, the Sixth Circuit held that an innocent spouse re-
tains her interest in the entireties estate so long as the estate remains
intact. 153 The government, however, assumes the position of a judg-
ment creditor entitled to the guilty spouse's interest in the property
upon severance of the estate.' 5 4 In contrast, the Third Circuit recently
determined that the guilty spouse immediately forfeits any interest in
the subject property to the government while the innocent spouse re-
tains "full and exclusive use and possession of the property . . . [for]
life."1 5 5
None of these circuit court decisions provides a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the conflict. In jurisdictions following the Eleventh Circuit's ra-
tionale, the government would be entitled to no portion of the estate-a
resolution in direct contravention of the policy of the Drug Control Act.
The Sixth Circuit's decision is equally flawed because it essentially
places the determination of the interests of the innocent spouse and the
government on hold for the duration of the entireties estate. In an at-
tempt to remedy the inadequacies of the decisions made by the Eleventh
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit also failed to provide a
satisfactory resolution of the conflict that arises between the statutory
language of § 881(a)(7) and state marital property laws. 156 The Third
Circuit simply avoided the issue by adopting the government's recom-
mendation for immediate forfeiture of the guilty spouse's interest in the
entireties property, while retaining full and exclusive use of the property
for the life of the innocent spouse.'
5 7
B. An Innocent Spouse's Marital Property May Survive Forfeiture Proceedings
The Eleventh Circuit recently articulated its rationale in United States
v. 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue. 158 In 15621 S. W 209th Avenue, the Eleventh
Circuit held that no portion of real property owned by husband and wife
as tenants by the entirety could be forfeited to the government under
the Drug Control Act when the innocent owner defense of subsection
881 (a)(7) applied to either of the spouses.159 In arriving at this conclu-
152. United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1512 (11th
Cir. 1990).
153. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991).
154. Id. at 350.
155. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 77.
158. 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1512. In 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue, the government sought the in
rem forfeiture of real property located in Florida and owned by Carlomilton and
Ibel Aguilera, husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety. Id. The government
1992] COMMENT 1511
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sion, the Eleventh Circuit applied the substantive law of Florida to de-
termine what ownership interest could be retained by the wife as an
innocent owner. 160 Under Florida common law, spouses can hold prop-
erty as tenants by the entirety provided that the five unities exist-mar-
riage, title, time, interest and control. 16 1 As long as the five unities are
present, the entireties estate continues and cannot be severed by the
unilateral action of one spouse. 16 2 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that the wife's ownership interest in 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue was that of
a tenant by the entirety. 163 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the wife held an "indivisible right to own and occupy the entire property
otherwise subject to forfeiture."' 164 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that no portion of the property could be forfeited since the wife's
"interest encompasse[d] all 'right, title and interest' in the property as
all three are indivisible between a husband and wife holding property by
the entireties." 165
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the civil forfeiture
provision of § 881(a)(7) and the relation-back doctrine codified in
commenced a forfeiture proceeding under § 881(a)(7) after Mr. Aguilera con-
ducted an illegal sale of cocaine to an undercover drug enforcement officer on
the premises. Id. Although Mr. Aguilera was subsequently convicted for co-
caine trafficking, Mrs. Aguilera successfully established the defense of innocent
ownership by proving that she did not know of or consent to the illegal drug
activity on the property. Id. at 1513. Consequently, Mrs. Aguilera was entitled
to retain her entire interest in the subject property. Id.
160. Id at 1514. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
which held that an innocent owner under § 881 (a)(7), Mr. Aguilera was entitled
to retain her indivisible interest in the entire property. Id. at 1520. The Elev-
enth Circuit found that Florida state property law had been properly applied to
determine what portion of the entireties estate could be forfeited to the govern-
ment as a result of Mr. Aguilera's criminal activity. Id. at 1514. The court held
that no portion of the estate was forfeitable because it "would penalize Mrs.
Aguilera for the wrongdoing of her husband, in which she neither participated
nor had knowledge." Id. at 1516.
161. Id. at 1514 (citing Andrews v. Andrews, 21 So. 2d 205, 206 (Fla.
1945)); see also Bechtel v. Estate of Bechtel, 330 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Mears v. Bechtel, 360 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1978).
162. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1515. The Eleventh Circuit noted
that an entireties estate can be severed in any of a variety of ways under Florida
law: (1) death of one of the spouses; (2) divorce or dissolution of the marriage;
(3) reconveyance by the spouses to themselves as tenants in common; (4) mur-
der of one spouse by another; (5) transfer by one spouse to the other in fee
simple; or (6) an instrument creating the entireties estate as limited in time. Id.
at 1514 n.2 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 1515. Under Florida property law, the state cannot cause the
forfeiture of entireties property based on the unlawful conduct of one spouse.
Id. at 1516. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Mrs. Aguilera retained her
indivisible interest in the subject property because she had satisfied her burden
under the innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7). Id.
164. Id. at 1515.
165. Id. at 1516. The Eleventh Circuit stated that any forfeiture would be
an unconstitutional taking without due process or just compensation. Id.
26
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§ 881(h).1 66 The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation provided that prop-
erty becomes subject to forfeiture upon a violation of the federal narcot-
ics law. 16 7 However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the language of
§ 881(a) (7) only entitles the government to obtain that portion of the
subject property that remains after the innocent owner's interest has
been set aside.16 8 Thus, the 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue court determined
that nothing could be forfeited to the government because the wife
owned an indivisible interest in the entire property.
169
In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit soundly rejected
the government's contention that the innocent owner's interest is deter-
mined after the government effects forfeiture. 170 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that subjecting any portion of the property to forfeiture would
not only offend the statutory scheme, but would also frustrate the con-
gressional intent underlying the statute-the imposition of a penalty
upon those involved in drug trafficking. 17' The Eleventh Circuit further
noted that the inclusion of the innocent owner defense in § 881(a) (7)
supports the proposition that Congress sought to protect innocent own-
ers from the harsh penalty of forfeiture.
172
In 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected the
government's argument that a rule of federal common law should be




168. Id. The Eleventh Circuit first noted that the objective of the forfeiture,
statutes is the imposition of a penalty upon wrongdoers. Id. In order to protect
innocents from unjust forfeiture, Congress included an innocent owner defense
in § 881(a)(7). Id. The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that a reading of
§ 881(a)(7) in tandem with § 881(h) yielded the result that the government was
entitled to "whatever interest remain [ed] in the property after the innocent
owner's interest had been excepted." Id.
169. Id. In a footnote, the court discussed "the possibility that if the [gov-
ernment] filed a lis pendens against the property, the government might acquire
in a later forfeiture proceeding Mr. Aguilera's interest in the property" should
the couple's interests become separate due to divorce, death or some other ac-
tion. Id. at 1516 n.6. Thus, the court reasoned that the government would not
be precluded from attempting to execute on its interest if the entireties estate
was subsequently changed. Id. The "[p]urpose of 'lis pendens' is to notify per-
spective purchasers and encumbrancers that any interest acquired by them in
property in litigation is subject to decision of court and while it is simply a notice
of pending litigation the effect thereof on the owner of property is con-
straining." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990).
170. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1517. The government argued that the district court erred in
applying state law to determine its property interest and that of Mrs. Aguilera
because Florida property law that prohibited forfeiture of a one-half interest in
the property conflicted directly with the federal forfeiture law. Id. The govern-
ment advocated the development of federal common law to resolve the issue.
Id.
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The government contended that federal law should preempt state prop-
erty law because the application of state property law defeated the pur-
pose of the civil forfeiture provisions of the Drug Control Act. 174 The
government advocated "a uniform federal rule of decision that 'the
United States is entitled to forfeit a one-half interest in property owned
by husband and wife where one spouse uses the property for narcotics
trafficking.' ",175 The Eleventh Circuit flatly rejected the government's
proposition and found that the district court "rightly used Florida state
law in determining the property interests."' 76 In its analysis, the Elev-
enth Circuit cited a general rule of law pronounced by the Supreme
Court that provides that state law will govern the determination of prop-
erty rights under federal statutes except when Congress expressly pro-
vides for preemption or when compliance with both state and federal
law is impossible.177 Under these exceptions, federal law will preempt
state law. 17 8 Applying this rule in 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that Florida law was properly applied to determine
the ownership interests of the innocent spouse because Florida law did
not conflict with federal law.' 79 The Eleventh Circuit found that no con-
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. In affirming the district court decision, the Eleventh Circuit found
that state property law of Florida had been applied properly to determine the
property interests of the parties in a manner consistent with the mandate of fed-
eral forfeiture law. Id. (noting that federal courts have discretion to determine
whether state law is appropriate or whether federal common law should be cre-
ated when federal statutes leave room for application of state law (citing United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973))).
177. See id. ("State family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear
and substantial' federal interest before federal law will override state law."
(quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966))); Oregon ex rel. State
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (indicating
that "property ownership governed by law of several states and not general fed-
eral law"); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1958) (applying state law
to determine extent of property interest under federal tax lien statute); United
States v. Gurley, 415 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that unique nature
of tenancy by entireties under Florida law precludes attachment of judgment
lien thereto).
178. See 15621 S. W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1517 (citing International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987)). Federal law preempts state law
in certain circumstances: (1) Congress specifically provides for preemption;
(2) federal regulation leaves no room for the application of state law; (3) state
law governs an area of federal interest thereby creating an actual conflict; or
(4) state law defeats the objectives of Congress in enacting a federal statute. Id.
at 1518.
179. Id. at 1518. The court reiterated that its decision was not based solely
on Florida's prohibition of the forfeiture of any interest of a spouse in entireties
property when the guilty spouse had acted independently. Id. at 1518 n.7.
Rather, the court explained that it was applying Florida law to define the inter-
ests of the owners of property while also giving effect to the two purposes of the
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flict existed because § 881 protects an innocent landowner from forfei-
ture whereas state law merely defines the property rights to be protected
from unjust forfeiture under § 881.180
C. Forfeiture Limited to a Creditor's Lien on Innocent
Spouse's Interest in Marital Property
The Sixth Circuit recently ruled on the same issue in United States v.
2525 Leroy Lane. 18 1 In 2525 Leroy Lane, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the
effect of federal drug forfeiture statutes upon an innocent spouse's
property interest in real property held by husband and wife as tenants by
the entirety under Michigan law. 18 2 The Sixth Circuit held that the in-
terest in property acquired by the government is "analogous to the posi-
tion occupied by a judgment creditor of one spouse under Michigan
law."1
83
180. Id. The court recognized that a conflict existed, but identified it as a
"dichotomy" within the federal statute with its dual purpose. Id.
181. 910 F.2d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991).
182. Id. at 347. The government appealed the district court decision, which
awarded the entire proceeds received from the sale of the subject property
seized under the Drug Control Act to the innocent owner. Id. at 344. The dis-
trict court case arose out of the consolidation of criminal and civil forfeiture
proceedings brought after an indictment charged Mr. Marks with several viola-
tions of federal narcotics laws. Id. at 344-45. The real property owned by Mr.
Marks and his wife as tenants by the entirety had been seized under § 853(a)(2),
the criminal forfeiture provision of the Drug Control Act. Id. at 345. The gov-
ernment also filed a civil complaint for forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) against the
real property while the criminal proceedings against Mr. Marks were pending.
Id. In response, Mrs. Marks filed a petition for a determination of her interest in
the subject property in both the criminal and civil proceedings. Id.
While the proceedings were pending, the parties agreed to sell the subject
property. Id. "[T]he proceeds of the sale were designated as [the] substitute res
in which the parties were deemed to have the same interest as they had in the
real estate." Id. During the the district court proceedings, the parties also stipu-
lated that Mrs. Marks was an innocent owner under § 881(a)(7). Id.
183. Id. at 351. The district court awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Marks
as the innocent owner of the subject property. Id. at 344. The district court
concluded that Mrs. Marks' interest in the subject res "constituted an interest in
the property as a whole, and that her innocent owner status operated to avoid
forfeiture as to the entire property." Id. at 345.
The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court decision and held that the entire
property vested in Mrs. Marks as she held an indivisible interest in the whole
property. Id. at 351. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the government could
only acquire that interest in the subject property which was held by Mr. Marks as
a cotenant of the entireties estate. Id. The court noted, however, that "the Gov-
ernment [could] not occupy the position of Mr. Marks in the entireties estate,
since the estate is founded on marital union, and the Government obviously
[could not] assume the role of spouse to Mrs. Marks." Id. Thus, the govern-
ment was precluded from obtaining the husband's interest unless or until Mrs.
Marks predeceased him, or the entireties estate terminated in some other man-
ner. Id.
The Sixth Circuit found that "the interest acquired by the Government
[was] most analogous to the position occupied by a judgment creditor of one
29
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The Sixth Circuit began its analysis with a review of Michigan's
property law regarding tenancy by the entirety.1 8 4 Under Michigan law,
a husband and wife who hold property as tenants by the entirety receive
a single title over the subject property with a right of survivorship.
18 5
Thus, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the wife, as the innocent owner of
the entireties estate, held an indivisible interest in the property coupled
with a right of survivorship "which would entitle her to sole ownership
of the property upon her husband's death."
18 6
The Sixth Circuit next considered the role to be accorded state
property laws under the federal forfeiture sections of in the Drug Con-
trol Act. 187 The Sixth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit in 15621 S. W.
209th Avenue, rejected the government's contention that federal com-
mon law should be developed by federal courts to determine property
rights of innocent owners under the statute.' 8 8 Rather, the Sixth Circuit
noted that the development of federal common law is inappropriate
when Congress has not provided for its development and when the in-
corporation of state law will not frustrate the congressional intent of the
forfeiture statute.' 89 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded "that recogni-
spouse under Michigan law." Id. This determination, had the property not
been sold, would have resulted in Mrs. Marks' being entitled to live in the house
as long as the entireties estate continued and in the government's obtaining a
lien. Id. Because the property was sold, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to determine "how to manage the fund of money in such a way
as will protect the Government's interest as a judgment creditor, while at the
same time permitting Mrs. Marks the use of that property consistent with her
interest as a tenant by the entireties." Id.
184. Id. at 346.
185. Id. (citing In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985); Sanford v.
Bertrau, 169 N.W. 880 (Mich. 1918)). Id. Under Michigan law, tenancy by the
entirety is a form of property ownership unique to the marital unit. Id. (citing
Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 228, 292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The law pro-
vides that "the husband and wife are but one person in the law." Id. Each
spouse is deemed "to own the whole, and therefore, is entitled to the enjoyment
of the entirety and to survivorship." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d
228, 292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)). The Sixth Circuit also noted that Michigan
law prohibits the alienation of property held in tenancy by the entirety by the
unilateral act of either spouse. Id. (citing Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 228,
292-93 (Mich Ct. App. 1989)). Furthermore, Michigan law prohibits creditors of
one spouse from levying on the property. Id. (citing In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d
773 (6th Cir. 1985)).
186. Id. at 347.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. In concluding that the development of federal common law was
unnecessary, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 347. In Yazell,
the Supreme Court considered the application of Texas property law to an ac-
tion seeking judgment on a Small Business Administration loan. Yazell, 382 U.S.
at 348-58. The Supreme Court concluded that state laws governing family prop-
erty rights would only be overridden by federal courts "where clear and substan-
tial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently
1516
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tion of state laws governing property rights does not contravene the fed-
eral forfeiture scheme, and that the application of state law is the most
appropriate method of determining the interest of an innocent
owner."19
0
The Sixth Circuit considered the extent to which the property held
by the wife as an innocent owner could be forfeited. 19 1 In addressing
this issue, the Sixth Circuit looked to the language of section
881(a)(7). 192 Section 881(a)(7) states that "no property shall be for-
feited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of" an innocent
owner. 19 3 The Sixth Circuit concluded that this language precluded
forfeiture where real property was owned by an innocent owner as a
tenant by the entirety.' 9 4 That interest, the Sixth Circuit continued,
amounted to an indivisible interest in the entire property.
19 5
with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is
applied." Id. 382 U.S. at 352.
190. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 347. The Sixth Circuit noted that, similar
to forfeiture statutes, federal tax lien statutes do not define property rights. Id.
at 348 (citing Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971)). Thus, federal
courts considering the issue have used state laws governing tenancy by the en-
tirety to determine "the interests available for the satisfaction of a federal tax
lien." Id.
191. Id. at 350.
192. Id.
193. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). For the full text of§ 881(a)(7), seesupra
note 12.
194. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 351.
195. Id. at 350. The court concluded that Michigan state property law pre-
cluded the ownership interest of the government when the property was owned
by an innocent owner as a tenant by the entireties. The Sixth Circuit thus re-
jected the government's contention that it was entitled to one-half of the prop-
erty. Id.
To support its position, the government had relied primarily on two theo-
ries. Id. at 349-50. First, the government cited United States v. Rodgers, 461
U.S. 677 (1983), which held that homestead laws in Texas did not protect prop-
erty from civil forfeiture under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, the federal tax lien statute.
2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 349 (citing Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 692-700). In Rod-
gers, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal tax lien statute subjects the
property of a delinquent taxpayer to forfeiture regardless of third party interest
until the delinquent taxpayer satisfies the obligation. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 694.
In 2525 Leroy Lane, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Rodgers by noting that prop-
erty rights under homestead laws differ from those under tenancy by the en-
tirety. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 349-50. The Sixth Circuit further noted that
Michigan law also precluded the attachment of entireties property for satisfac-
tion of the personal tax liability of a single spouse. Id. at 350.
The government also contended that the relation-back provision in
§ 881 (h) converted the entireties estate into a tenancy in common upon a viola-
tion of the federal narcotics law. Id. The Sixth Circuit also rejected this argu-
ment. Id. But see United States v. 11885 S.W. 46th St., 751 F. Supp. 1538, 1540
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that government becomes co-owner of property with
innocent spouse when entireties estate severed by wrongdoing). The Sixth Cir-
cuit reasoned that such forfeiture would unjustly reduce the innocent spouse's
ownership interest in the entire property as defined by state law. 2525 Leroy
Lane, 910 F.2d at 350. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the language of
31
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the government could obtain
no greater interest in the subject property than that held by the husband
prior to the initiation of the forfeiture proceedings.1 9 6 This logic neces-
sarily precludes the government from obtaining the husband's interest
in the subject property unless and until the entireties estate termi-
nates. 19 7 As a result, the Sixth Circuit found the government's position
analogous to that of a judgment creditor. 198 As a judgment creditor,
the government was entitled to attach a creditor's lien on the husband's
interest in the subject property which could then be satisfied upon sever-
ance of the entireties estate.' 9 9
D. Serving Dual Goals Under § 881(a)(7)
The Third Circuit also considered the same issue in United States v.
§ 881 (a)(7) does not evidence a congressional intent to destroy or diminish the
entireties interest of an innocent owner. Id. To the contrary, Congress included
the innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7) to protect the property interests of
the innocent owner. Id.
196. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 351. The Sixth Circuit noted that the
government could not assume the ownership interest of the husband because
Michigan law required that tenants by the entirety be husband and wife. Id. The
Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that the government would be entitled to Mr.
Marks' interest when and if Mrs. Marks died, or upon the severance of the en-
tireties estate. Id.
197. Id. The Sixth Circuit specifically recognized that Michigan property
law provided for the termination and conversion of the entireties estate under
certain circumstances. Id. First, the death of one spouse triggered the right of
survivorship in the remaining spouse, thereby converting the survivor's owner-
ship interest to fee simple absolute ownership. Id. Second, the entireties estate
became a tenancy in common by operation of law upon the spouses' divorce. Id.
198. Id. at 351. Under Michigan law, a judgment creditor of one spouse of
an entireties estate has limited rights. Id. at 352. A judgment creditor cannot
force a sale of the entireties property to satisfy one spouse's obligations. Id.
Nor can a judgment creditor reach the "husband's share of proceeds from a
foreclosure sale" of the entireties property. Id. However, the Sixth Circuit
found that the government, as a judgment creditor, would be entitled to attach a
creditor's lien upon Mr. Marks' interest that would be satisfied upon the termi-
nation of the entireties estate. Id. Consistent with this conclusion, the Sixth
Circuit stated that Mrs. Marks would be entitled to the entire estate should Mr.
Marks predecease her, while she would only be entitled to one-half of the fund
should the entireties estate terminate otherwise. Id. Similarly, the government
would only be entitled to the entire fund if Mrs. Marks predeceased Mr. Marks,
and to "one half the fund upon some other termination of the estate." Id.
199. Id. at 352. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine how to protect the rights of Mrs. Marks and the government during
the pendency of the estate. Id. The parties had actually sold the property and
stipulated that the proceeds from that sale would retain the same qualities as the
entireties property. See id. at 351. Thus, on remand, the district court had to
determine "how to manage the fund of money in such a way as ... [to] protect
the Government's interest as a judgment creditor, while at the same time per-
mitting Mrs. Marks the use of the property consistent with her interest as a ten-
ant by the entireties." Id.
1518 [Vol. 37: p. 1487
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1500 Lincoln Avenue. 200 In 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third Circuit held
that a spouse who had satisfied the innocent owner defense in
§ 881 (a)(7) was entitled to "full and exclusive use of the property during
her life," while allowing the government to obtain immediate forfeiture
of the guilty spouse's interest in the entireties property.2 0 ' In an at-
tempt to provide a solution that would best serve the dual goals of
§ 881(a)(7), the Third Circuit examined the statutory language of
§ 881(a)(7) and its accompanying legislative history.20 2 The court also
evaluated recent decisions addressing the conflict that arises between
§ 881(a)(7) and state marital property laws defining tenancy by the
entirety.
20 3
In an effort to reconcile the competing interests of federal forfeiture
law and state marital property law, the Third Circuit analyzed the statu-
tory language of § 881(a) (7) and the accompanying legislative his-
tory.20 4 The Third Circuit noted that the language of § 881(a)(7)
provides for forfeiture of any interest in real property upon a violation
of the Drug Control Act "except for the interest of an innocent
owner." 20 5 The court stated that the statutory language did not address
the effect of forfeiture on marital property owned by spouses as tenants
by the entirety.20 6 Reviewing the legislative history, the Third Circuit
concluded that the history also failed to provide the requisite
guidance.
20 7
By considering the opinions of both the Eleventh Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit sought to adopt the solution that best
served the dual goals of § 881 (a) (7): "forfeiture of the property used in
committing drug offenses and preservation of the property rights of in-
200. 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991). The subject property contained a phar-
macy owned by Leonard and Linda Bernstein, husband and wife, as tenants by
the entirety as defined under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 74-75. The pharmacy was
used to facilitate the illegal distribution of prescription drugs and thus was sub-
ject to forfeiture under the Drug Control Act. Id. The Third Circuit reversed
the district court's holding that the United States was not entitled to any prop-
erty and held that the innocent owner defense of the wife did not preclude for-
feiture of some interest in the subject property. Id. at 74.
201. Id. at 77.
202. Id. at 76-77.
203. Id. at 77-78.
204. Id. at 76-77.
205. Id. at 76.
206. Id. at 77. In fact, the Third Circuit noted that the "statutory language
is susceptible to diametrically opposed interpretations." Id. at 76. The court
explained that owning property at a tenant by the entirety means owning the
whole estate. Id. Thus, if a guilty spouse's interest is forfeited upon a violation
of the Drug Control Act, the forfeiture "means forfeiture of the whole estate."
Id. Conversely, an innocent spouse retains the entire estate because he or she
also owns an indivisible interest in it, thus leaving no interest to be forfeited to
the government. Id.
207. Id. at 76-77.
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nocent owners." 20 8 The court evaluated the analysis of the Eleventh
Circuit in15621 S.W. 209th Avenue, and rejected it. 20 9 In 15621 S.W.
2091h Avenue, the Eleventh Circuit held that none of the subject property
owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety could be forfeited
under § 881(a)(7) if the innocent owner defense had been invoked.
2 10
The Eleventh Circuit did, however, preserve in a footnote the possibility
of the government attempting to acquire the husband's interest in a
later forfeiture proceeding, should the entireties estate terminate. 2 ' m
The Third Circuit reasoned that this solution was inadequate because it
"frustrates the strong governmental interest in forfeiture since it per-
mits a guilty spouse during his or her lifetime to retain title as a tenant
by the entireties in property that he or she has used in illegal drug
activities." 1
212
The Third Circuit next considered the opinion of the Sixth Circuit
in 2525 Leroy Lane.2 13 The court did not expressly adopt the approach
of the Sixth Circuit, nor did it examine the analytical framework of 2525
Leroy Lane, but rather seemed to accept the decision as the underlying
rationale for the government's proposed solution in the case before
it. 2 14 The approach advocated by the government, which was loosely
based on 2525 Leroy Lane, purportedly provided for the immediate for-
feiture of the guilty spouse's interest in the subject property, while al-
lowing the innocent spouse to retain a life estate in the property with a
right of survivorship. 21 5 This approach, however, like that of the Sixth
Circuit, essentially denies the immediate forfeiture of the subject prop-
208. Id. at 77.
209. Id. at 77-78; see also United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d
1511 (11 th Cir. 1990). For further discussion of 15621 S. W 209th Ave., see supra
notes 158-80 and accompanying text.
210. 15621 S.W 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516.
211. Id. at 1516 n.6. For further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's recog-
nition of the government's potential interest in the property in 15621 S. W. 209th
Ave., see supra note 169.
212. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78.
213. Id. at 75, 78; see United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991).
For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's decision in 2525 Leroy Lane, see supra notes
181-99 and accompanying text.
214. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 75, 77-78. The Third Circuit explained
that "[r]elying on the Sixth Circuit's recent decision .... the government con-
tended that it should at least be able to obtain 'any separate interest which [the
husband] would be entitled to should he survive or divorce [the wife] or should
the entireties be severed in any other manner.' " Id. at 75. The Third Circuit
appeared to adopt this solution with little or no examination of the underlying
Sixth Circuit opinion. Id. at 78.
215. Id. at 77. The innocent spouse actually retains all of the property
rights of a tenant by the entirety, including the protection "against any convey-
ance without his or her consent or any attempt to levy upon the interest formerly
held by the guilty spouse." Id. at 77-78. Finally, "the innocent owner retains
the right to obtain title in fee simple absolute if he or she is predeceased by the
guilty spouse." Id. at 78.
(Vol. 37: p. 14871520
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erty while recognizing the government's ability to assume the position of
a lien creditor of the guilty spouse.2 16 The Third Circuit limited its con-
sideration of the issue to the interpretation offered by the government
and other interpretations that would result in a lesser degree of forfei-
ture.2 17 Rather than seize the opportunity to outline a framework that
would provide guidance to other courts considering the same issue, the
Third Circuit opted out of fashioning its own solution and ultimately
adopted the solution advocated by the government.
2 1 8
E. Conflict Among the Circuits
An analysis of the three recent circuit court decisions reveals that all
three recognize the inherent conflict that exists between protecting mar-
ital property in tenancy by the entirety and effecting the civil forfeiture
provisions of § 881 (a)(7). 2 19 As the dissent in the Sixth Circuit opinion
of 2525 Leroy Lane noted, the Eleventh Circuit in 15621 S. W. 209th Ave-
nue and the majority in 2525 Leroy Lane applied the same logic yet ar-
rived at two opposite conclusions. 220 Both the Eleventh and the Sixth
Circuits relied on state law to determine the property rights of innocent
owners of real property under § 881 (a)(7). 2 2 1 Yet this reliance on state
law results in inconsistent dispositions of real property.
2 22
Any forfeiture of real property under § 881 depends upon the laws
of the state where the real property is located. 22 3 In a jurisdiction that
adopts the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, an innocent spouse is
deemed to have an ownership interest in the whole entireties estate
which precludes any forfeiture of the subject property to the govern-
ment.2 24 As the dissent in 2525 Leroy Lane opined, this reasoning seems
convoluted, at best, because the spouse accused of using the subject
property to facilitate a violation of federal narcotics laws also has an in-
divisible interest in the entire property. 2 25 Similarly, the dissent in 2525
216. See 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 351-52.
217. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 77.
218. Id. at 77-78.
219. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991); 2525 Leroy Lane, 910
F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990); 15621 S. W. 209th Ave. 894 F.2d 1511 (11 th Cir. 1990).
220. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 356 (Krupansky,J., dissenting). The dis-
sent contended that the forfeiture in 15621 S. W. 209th Ave. was forfeiture in
name only. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting). The government did not gain an
alienable property interest, but rather the right to " 'file [a] is pendens against
the property' noticing the public of an inchoate, undefinable potential cloud on
title to the realty." Id. (Krupansky,J., dissenting). In essence, the dissent argues




223. See 15621 SW. 209th Ave., 894 F. 2d at 1514.
224. See id. at 1512; 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 354.
225. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 356 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent argued that the Eleventh Circuit's decision "[c]onveniently ignor[ed] the
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Leroy Lane faults the Sixth Circuit's majority opinion, which essentially
places a "final resolution of the real property rights between the owners
of the entireties estate and the government in abeyance pending divorce
or death."'2 26 This result defeats the deterrent purpose of the Drug
Control Act; the innocent owner is not free to alienate his or her interest
in the subject property, and the government is deprived of any meaning-
ful rights in the property because it occupies the position of a "life-long
judgment creditor. ' 22 7 The Third Circuit, while critical of the logic and
analyses in both decisions, failed to provide a solution resolving the con-
flict in a satisfactory manner.
Due to their inconsistencies, the circuit courts' decisions fail to fur-
ther the purpose of Congress in enacting the Drug Control Act.22 8 In
15621 S. W. 209th Avenue, the Eleventh Circuit decision confers a benefit
on the innocent spouse rather than on the government. 22 9 The court
initially invoked the relation-back doctrine in § 881 (h) to find the subject
property forfeitable, but proceeded to conclude that no part of the en-
tireties estate could be forfeited because the innocent spouse retained
an indivisible interest in the entire estate which could not be severed.
230
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit impliedly finds that the relation-back doc-
trine severs the entireties estate in favor of the innocent spouse when
the wrongdoing occurs.2 31 Although this conclusion is consistent with
congressional intent to protect innocent owners from unjust forfeiture,
it directly contravenes the policy underlying the Drug Control Act-to
punish wrongdoers for substantive violations of the law.2 32 The Elev-
enth Circuit's decision also ignores the fact that its logic could lead to
the opposite conclusion; under the same rationale, the property could
be found forfeitable because the entireties estate had been tainted by
the wrongdoing of one spouse who held an indivisible interest over the
very tangible ownership interest of the convicted spouse," which also extended
to the entire estate. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
228. The goal of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was "to
enhance the use of forfeiture .. .as a law enforcement tool combatting ...
racketeering and drugtrafficking." S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 21, at 192.
229. 15621 S.W 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516 n.6 (noting that interest in
property cannot be forfeited at present time because innocent spouse has inter-
est as tenant by the entirety).
230. Id. (indicating that government only receives what is left after innocent
owner's interest has been taken out).
231. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit further noted that the government
could file a lis pendens against the property which would enable the government
to levy on its interest should the entirety terminate. Id. at 1516 n.6. Upon ter-
mination of the entirety estate, the interests of the spouses would become "sepa-
rable so that forfeiture of [the husband's] interest in the property would not
affect [the wife's] interest." Id.
232. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 356 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit's decision in 2525 Leroy Lane is fraught
with inconsistencies which weaken the opinion. In 2525 Leroy Lane, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the government obtained the interest held
by the accused spouse upon the commission of the wrongdoing pursu-
ant to the relation-back doctrine.2 3 4 To reconcile this finding and state
property law governing tenancy by the entirety, the Sixth Circuit found
that the government became a lien creditor of the entireties estate and
would remain so until the estate terminated. 235 This decision, like
15621 S. W. 209th Avenue, is flawed in that it too implicitly relies upon the
relation-back doctrine of § 881 (h) to effectively sever the entireties es-
tate.2 36 As it stands, however, neither the government nor the innocent
owner can alienate their interests in the estate. This result not only con-
travenes state property law, but also thwarts the purpose behind the
Drug Control Act by postponing the government's ability to realize its
rights until the entireties estate is actually severed or terminated. 23 7
This decision thus precludes the free alienation of the subject property
by the innocent spouse until the entireties estate terminates-a direct
contravention of the notions of free alienability of property.
Recognizing the shortfalls of the solutions of the Sixth Circuit and
the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit attempted to create a solution
that would serve the purpose of the Drug Control Act while protecting
the integrity of the entireties estate under state property law. Unfortu-
nately, the Third Circuit failed to achieve its goal. Rather than formu-
late a solution to address the inherent conflict between state marital
property law and the civil forfeiture provisions of § 881 (a) (7), the Third
Circuit adopted the compromise offered by the government, thereby en-
tirely neglecting to address the issue. 2 38 The Third Circuit reasoned
that the compromise offered by the government remedied the shortfalls
of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' decisions because it provided for the
immediate forfeiture of the guilty spouse's interest in the entireties estate
233. Id. (Krupansky,J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 350-51.
235. Id. at 350. In 2525 Leroy Lane, the subject property had been sold. Id.
at 345. During the pendency of the proceeding, the parties agreed that the pro-
ceeds were to retain the same qualities as the entireties estate. Id. The Sixth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine the nature of the
parties' rights over the proceeds of the sale. Id. at 352. The Sixth Circuit in-
structed the district court to find, on remand, a solution which would be consis-
tent with the Circuit's determination that the innocent wife did not gain title to
the entire estate. Id. Such a finding would have effectively eliminated the gov-
ernment's interest, thereby granting the wife a windfall. Id. The Sixth Circuit
also instructed the district court to review the case consistent with its determina-
tion that the government occupied the position of a judgment creditor of one
spouse under Michigan law. Id. at 351.
236. Id. at 353-56 (Krupansky,J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 352.
238. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991).
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while protecting the innocent spouse's interest in the entireties
estate.
239
The Third Circuit views its decision as a remedy for the inherent
conflict between the interests of the innocent spouse and the goals of
the Drug Control Act; however, the opinion glosses over the fact that
the "immediate" forfeiture to the government amounts to forfeiture in
name only. In actuality, the Third Circuit's solution differs little from
that of the Sixth Circuit. In both scenarios, the government's interest is
effectively placed in abeyance until the entireties estate terminates
through death or divorce. Thus, the Third Circuit decision does not
really provide a viable third alternative.
The Third Circuit opted out of an independent analysis and ac-
cepted a compromise without fully considering the underlying conflict
or the consequences of its inaction. The Third Circuit stated that it had
adopted the government's compromise because it best served the dual
purposes of the Drug Control Act; however, that assertion is not true. 240
By failing to address the issue directly, the Third Circuit rejected the
opportunity to resolve the underlying conflict by reconciling the com-
peting interests of the government and the innocent spouse. Instead,
the Third Circuit adopted a fact-specific solution which resolved the
case before it but provided little if any guidance to other courts consid-
ering the issue.
24 1
As suggested by the Sixth Circuit dissent in 2525 Leroy Lane, the
only equitable solution to this issue may be the development of preemp-
tive federal common law.2 42 This common law would define the rights
of both the innocent owner spouse and the government when the sub-
ject property is used to facilitate a violation of the Drug Control Act.24 3
A federal rule of common law that converts the entireties estate into a
tenancy in common between the innocent spouse and the government
when the wrongdoing occurs might provide for more consistent re-
suits. 2 4 4 This solution is not ideal because the innocent property
owner's rights are diminished when the estate is converted into a ten-
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. As the Third Circuit itself recognized, the compromise offered by the
government gave the court an easy "out." Id. at 77. In the words of the Third
Circuit, "[iln light of the government's position, we need not consider possible
interpretations that would provide for a greater degree of forfeiture." Id.
242. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 353 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). The
majority specifically rejected the government's contention that the courts should
develop federal common law to deal with property rights in forfeiture actions.
Id. at 347-49.
243. Id. at 356 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). The "paramount government
interest" in creating the forfeiture laws is to create "a uniform, immediate, cer-
tain, harsh and efficious sanction against those who elect to profit from a venture
as pernicious as trading drugs." Id. at 354.
244. Id. at 356 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
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ancy in common; however, it is an equitable compromise which would
provide a solution to this conflict that is amenable to consistent applica-
tion. 24 5 Furthermore, this solution would not necessarily undermine
the sanctity of the entireties estate because the uniform federal common
law would only override the system of property ownership in the partic-
ular situation of illicit use of property under the Drug Control Act. Un-
less and until Congress addresses this issue by amending the statute to
resolve the conflict between federal civil forfeiture laws and state marital
property law, equity calls upon the federal courts to develop federal
common law. Federal common law would not only provide guidance,
but would also provide "certainty, uniformity and efficacy in [civil] for-
feiture" of real property under the Drug Control Act.
24 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The lack of consistent judicial precedent combined with the lack of
concrete legislative history regarding the civil forfeiture provisions of
the Drug Control Act mandate the development of federal common law.
Federal common law in this area would resolve the conflict between fed-
eral forfeiture laws and state marital property laws in jurisdictions where
spouses own property as tenants by the entirety. Federal common law
would also provide guidance to courts considering the issue and would
result in more consistent decisions regarding the disposition of property
deemed forfeitable upon a violation of the Drug Control Act. Given the
pressing need to provide federal law enforcement officials with powerful
weapons to wage the escalating war on drugs, and the inconsistencies
that result when state property law is applied to determine the property
rights of the innocent spouse and the government, the development of
federal common law may be the most equitable and intellectually honest
solution until Congress provides a statutory resolution of this issue.
Anne-Marie Feeley
245. Id. at 354-56 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 356 (Krupansky,J., dissenting).
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